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FIRST DAY 
VIRG2:NEA :30ARD OF BAR EX.'.1\1£.1~N:S:RS 
11ichrriond1 Virginia 
June 29-30, 1964 
QUESTIONS 
SECTION ONE 
1. Duncan was on trial for the murder of Clark. The 
evidence disclosed that Duncan went to Clark's room in a hotel 
about 9 o'clock p. m.; that he left in five minutes; and that about 
10 o'clock p. m. Clark telephoned the hotel clerk to call an 
ambulance to_take him to a hospital. The hotel clerk was then 
asked: "What did Clark say, if anything, as to how he was 
injured"? If permitted to answer the question, the clerl{ would 
have said: "I aslced Mr. Clark what had happened and he said, 
'Duncan came to my room and hit me with a blackjack. Get me to 
the hospital quiclcly or I may die; it's been an hour since I was 
hurt and I am bleeding. ' '' 
Is the evidence admissible? 
2. Upon the trial of an action of debt for goods sold, 
the plaintiff introduced his bookkeeper as a witness solely to 
identify the order given by the defendant for the goods. The 
defendant, on cross-examination, asked this witness: "Were these 
goods as warranted;i? The plaintiff, by counl?el, objected to the 
question on the ground that it was not proper cross-examination. 
How ought the Court to rule? 
3. A motion for judgment alleged that Defendant 
negligently operated his automobile and thereby struck Plaintiff 
and caused him severe personal injuries. Defendant, within the 
permitted timeJ filed a paper setting outJ under appropriate 
headings, the following: 
(1) 
negligence were not 
(2) 
injuries sustained. 
A demurrer because the particulars of the 
stated. 
A motion for a bill of particulars of the 
(3) A counterclaim against Plaintiff for $2,500, 
balance due on a note. 
(4) That the action was barred by a statute of 
limitations. 
(5) That he denied the charge of negligence. 
Plaintiff objected to the paper and moved to strike it out 
on the grounds: 
That it was multifarious; 
That Defendant was not entitled to know the 
particulars of the 
(c) 
particulars of the 
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injuries; 
That it was not necessary to set out the 
negligence; 
(d) That the counterclaim could not be asserted in 
the pending action; and 
(e) That the paper did 
statute of limitations relied on. 
not specify the particular 
How ought the Court to rule on each ground? 
4 .-- Anderson sued Brown, Carter and Daniel in the Circuit 
Court of Clarke County for injuries sustained by Anderson while a 
guest passenger in Brown's automobile when it was involved in a 
three-way collision with cars operated by Carter and Daniel. Carter, 
within the proper time, filed his responsive pleading, denying 
liability to Anderson and asserting a claim against Brown and Daniel 
for injuries sustained by him (Carter) in the collision. 
Anderson, Brown and Daniel all objected to this procedure. 
How ought the Court to rule? 
5, James owned an antique desk which Roberts bought from 
him for $1, 000, and which Roberts paid, saying: 11 Keep the desk for 
me until tomorrow and I will send and get it." Later the same day, 
Williams was at the James home, saw the desk, and offered James 
$1,500 for it. James accepted the offer, got the money, delivered 
the des1c to Williams and left for parts unknown. 
Roberts tells you the above facts and he wants you to get 
the desk for him, saying Williams had it and claimed to own it. 
~~ ~ 
in what court 
(c) 
What form of action would you institute? 
Assuming both parties are residents of Wythe 
or courts might the action be brought? 
How would it be instituted? 
County, 
6. James White of Baltimore, Maryland, purportedly 
executed a deed of trust to Henry Brown, Trustee, of Richmond, 
Virginia, to secure ratably for John Williams of Richmond, Virginia, 
the payment of a note for $18,ooo and for Thomas Hanson of Elkton, 
Maryland, the payment of a note for $12,000. The property embraced 
in the deed of trust was real estate in Montgomery County, Maryland, 
worth $40,000. Default was made in the payment of both notes and 
Williams requested the Trustee to sell under the deed of trust. 
The Trustee promptly notified White of l:lis intention to foreclose, 
and was informed by White that the purported deed of trust was a 
forgery and was never executed by him. Brown, as Trustee, then 
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brought ari action in the United States District Court in B:tltimore 
to effect the foreclosure, joining Williams as a party plaintiff 
and White and Hanson as parties defendant. White, by appropriate 
pleadings, moved the Court: 
To make Hanson a party plaintiff; and 
Then to dismiss the action. 
How ought the Court to rule on each motion? 
7. 
charging that 
an assault on 
bodily injury 
and kill him, 
An indictment was found against Carl Cranson 
he "unlawfully, feloniously and maliciously did make 
Thomas Ryan with a certain club, wounding and causing 
to said Ryan with intent to maim, disable, dis.figure 
the said Ryan. 11 
(1) Upon the trial on this indictment, of what 
offenses might Cronson be found guilty? 
(2) Assume that the jury returned a verdict reading: 
"We, the jury, find Carl Cranson guilty of' unlawful wounding and 
fix his punishment at confinerr.ent in the State Penitentiary for a 
period of three years," and further assume that Cranson made a 
timely motion to set aside the verdict because fatally defective; 
how ought the Court to rule? 
8. Anxious instituted in the Circuit Court of Surry 
County on June 1, 1964, a suit in equity to quiet title to a certain 
parcel of land by filing his bill in the clerk's office, to which 
were attached numerous documents referred to in the bill as 
exhibits. Bestman, Cutter, and Driller, all residents of Surry 
County, were named defendants. 
Bestman and Cutter were served with process on June 15, 
1964, but, after having the process for Driller in hand for twenty-
two days, the sheriff made his return that he had been unable to 
effect service on Driller. 
Bestman feels that he has a valid defense to the suit and· 
a valid claim for relief against Anxious in regard to a matter 
concerning the property in question and wishes to do whatever is 
necessary to establish his claim and, therefore, consults his 
attorney on June 26, 1964. 
Cutter intends to dispute Anxious' claim and notes that 
none of the copies of the bill served on the defendants have copies 
of the exhibits attached to them and that these documents are very 
rnaterial to the issues and are necessary to have for answering the 
bill. Accordingly, Cutter raises the question as to Anxious' 
l:ight to proceed wi t11 the suit since no copies of the exhibits were 
attached to the copy of the bill served on him, and also, consults 
his attorney on June 26, 1964. 
(1) What can and should Anxious do in regard to 
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effecting valid service on Driller? 
(2) What can and should Bestman do in regard to 
asserting (a) his defense to the suit, and (b) his claim for relief 
against Anxious? 
(3) Is Cutter's contention in regard to Anxious' 
failure to attach copies of the exl1ibits valid'? 
9. Attorney Edmunds represented plaintiff in a certain 
court action against the defendant, alleging plaintiff was injured 
as a result of defendant's negligence, wherein defendant was 
represented by Attorney Fuller. A jury trial of the action resulted 
in a verdict-on March 3, 1964, for the plaintiff. Defendant's 
Attorney Fuller moved to set the verdict aside and enter judgment 
for the defendant on the ground that the verdict was contrary to the 
law and the evidence, or in the alternative, to grant defendant a 
new trial because of errors committed during trial. This motion was 
continued and was argued April 1, 1964, and the judge overruled the 
motion and entered final judgment for the plaintiff on the same day. 
Fuller then requested the court reporter to transcribe the 
evidence and though the reporter promised that the transcript would 
be ready in fifteen days, he became ill and the transcript of the 
evidence was not delivered to Fuller until the morning of May 23, 
1964. On the same day, Fuller served written notice on Edmunds 
that the transcript was in Fuller's office, available for inspection, 
and would be presented to the judge in his chambers on May 29, 1964, 
at 10:00 a. m. for certification. It was so presented, but Edmunds 
was not present at this time and gave no explanation for his absence. 
In spite of Fuller's urging the judge to sign the transcript at the 
time, the judge assured him tb.at he would take care of it in at 
least two days' time, but became busy and finally certified the 
transcript by signing it on June 8, 1964. It was delivered to the 
clerk on the same day. 
Fuller, believing that the judge would certify the 
transcript, had filed with the clerk on May 29, 1964, a notice of 
ap~eal and assignments of error, the assignments of error being as 
follows: 
"(l) The Court erred in entering judgment on the verdict, 
as the same Has contrary to the law and the evidence in that 
the evidence showed as a matter of law that the defendant was 
free from negligence and the plaintiff was guilty of contribu-
tory negligence. 
"(2) The Court erred in granting improper instructions 
on behalf of che plaintiff and not granting proper instructions 
on behalf of the defendant." 
(a) Was the certification of the transcript timely and 
sufficient? 
(b) Were the notice of appeal and assignments of error 
timely and sufficient? 
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10. By the law of one of the States of the Union (herein 
referred to as State X), a corpora~ion is forbidden to hold an 
interest in land not actually used for corporate purposes. By the 
law of another State of the Union (herein referred to as State Y), 
a corporation may hold for any purpose land valued at less than 
$1,000,000, but may.not for any purpose hold land of a greater value. 
Blue Sky, Incorporated, a corporation of State X, but domesticated 
in State Y, holds land in State Y valued at $600,000, and uses this 
land for the purposes for which it is chartered, The corporation 
has an opportunity to buy additional land in State Y valued at 
$250,000. The directors of the corporation consult you as to the 
right of the corporation to make tl:le purchase, advising that the 
corporation cannot use this land in the performance of its 
corporate purposes, but they are confident that it can hold the 
property for three or four years and then sell it at a substantial 
profit. 
How would you advise the directors? 
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VIRGINIA BOARD OF BAR EXAMINERS 
Richmond) Virginia 
June 29-30, 1964 
QUESTIONS 
SECTION TWO 
1. Al Able, trading as Able Electric Company, operated 
an electrical contracting and sales agency business withhlmself in 
active overall charge, his son-in-law as general manager and sales-
man and employing four men as mechanics and maintenance men. Able 
was interested in selling a special type of refrigerator to Ben 
Bella, resta~rateur. In an attempt to make the sale it was agreed 
that Able would install the unit on trial to see if it would give 
adequate service during the restaurant's busy periods over the 
succeeding six weeks, sai.d trial to end August 15th. During this 
six-week period Cal Cruller, one of Able's employee-mechanics and 
maintenance men went to Bella's restaurant on two occasions to 
check on the refrigerator unit and to make certain minor adjustments. 
Not having heard anything from Bella in regard to the unit, Able 
sent Bella a bill for the same on October 1. Bella refused to pay, 
saying that he did not want the unit as it had proven to be 
unsatisfactory, and Able sued him for the purchase price. 
At the trial Bella testified that he told Cruller when he 
was at the restaurant the second time, which was two weeks before 
the trial period ended, that he didn't want Cruller to service the 
unit as he did not want it and was not going to buy it and that 
Cruller should give this message to Able. Cruller testified that 
he was very busy during that period of time and didn't remember any 
such conversation with Bella, although he could not deny the same 
and he couldn't say whether or not he communicated any such message 
to Able. Able testified that nothing was said to him by anyone. 
At the conclusion of the evidence defendant Bella offered 
an instruction to the effect that if the jury believed that Bella 
had the related conversation with Cruller, then this contituted a 
sufficient notification to Able of Bella's intention not to purchase 
the unit and the jury should find in favor of the defendant. 
Should the court grant this instruction? 
2. Gormand was the owner of a thriving restaurant 
business located on premises for which he had a three-year assignable 
lease, but because of his age, he had decided he should sell the 
business. He entered into a listing agreement dated June 1, 1963, 
with Hussell, a real estate agent, whereby Hussell had an exclusive 
listing for forty-five days for the sale of the business which 
included the name, goodwill, equipment, lease interest, etc., for 
$20,000 cash with the commission to Hussell of 7% of the sale price. 
Russell contacted a number of people and finally obtained a written 
offer from Vintner, dated July 1, 1963, to buy the business for 
$5,000 cash and balance in monthly payments secured by chattel 
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mortgage, the offer to be binding on Vintner only if he could obtain 
an A. B. C. license and a five-year lease on the premises, both of 
which had been applied for. This offer was rejected by Gormand as 
"not being for $20,000, all cash. 11 Thereafter on July 7, 1963, 
another written offer of Vintner's was submitted for $18,000, all 
cash, and subject to obtaining A. B. c. license and five-year lease. 
This was also rejected by Gormand as "not being for $20,000, all 
cash." On July 12, 1963, a tJ.1ird written offer of Vintner's was 
submitted stating thac he would buy the business for $20,000 cash 
subject only to obtaining A. B. c. license and five-year lease, and 
that he hoped to have the license and lease within a very short 
while. Gormand made no answer to this, and when conbacted, declined 
to sign a contract of sale but would not give any reason for doing so. 
On July 30, 1963, Hussell learned much to his distress 
that Gormand had sold the business on July 29 to Boyardee, a stranger 
to Hussell, for $25,000. Hussell sued Gormand for his commission, 
claiming that he had produced a buyer pursuant to the listing agree-
ment, that Gormand had never raised any objection to the provision 
as to obtaining an A. B. c. license or lease when rejecting the two 
offers prior to the last one, tnat he would give no reason for not 
accepting the final $20,000 cash offer, but that the implication was 
clear that the reason for refusal was that he had a prospective 
buyer at a higher price. Gormand testified at the trial that in 
his mind he did not want to tie up his business awaiting Vintner's 
obtaining the license or lease, but admitted he had not stated this 
in regard to the first two offers and did not give this or any 
other reason for rejecting the final offer. 
Is Hussell entitled to recover in his action for a 
commission against Gormand? 
3. Sam Suburban wanted to leave the teeming city and· buy 
a home in the suburbs. He found a wooded area that was being 
developed into homesites and was shown various sites by Stu Sellem, 
the agent of the owner-developer Tanglewood, Inc. Sellem advised 
that an existing lake owned by Tangle Lake, Inc., an entirely 
separate corporation, on which some of the sites fronted, was to be 
cleaned out and lowered and sand beaches installed and that obviously 
these sites would be more desirable than the non-waterfront sites 
and therefore would cost more. Sam Suburban had always wanted to 
live on the water so he executed a written contract with Tanglewood, 
Inc., for the purchase of water front lot number 52, and for the 
construction thereon of the dream house model home. The contract 
and deed pursuant thereto also provided that the 11 ••• lot 52 is to 
be completely sodded and with a forty foot sand beach installed by 
Tanglewood, Inc., it being further understood that the lake is to be 
cleared out by Tangle Lake, Inc., up to lot 52 and the forty foot 
sand beach is not to be installed until the lake is cleaned out and 
lowered by Tangle Lake, Inc." 
Suburban moved in upon completion of the house but before 
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the lake and beach work had been done. After a year's time and 
after many protests, this worl{ was still not done. Tanglewood, Inc., 
then advised Suburban that Tangle Lake, Inc., had given Tanglewood, 
Inc., every reason to believe that it would clean out and lower the 
lalrn, but to the surprise of Tanglewood, Inc., ·chere was not an 
enforceable contract for this and Tangle Lake, Inc., had now refused 
to do this work. Tllerefore,Ta:nglewood, Inc., advised that it could 
not and was not obligated t;o install the beach because the lake had 
not been lowered as contemplated by all parties to the contract and 
deed. 
Suburban brought an action against Tanglewood, Inc., for 
damages as represented by the difference in value of his homesite 
with and without the clean lake and beach, but Tanglewood, Inc., 
contended that Suburban was not entitled to any recovery because he 
did in fact have a water front lot and by his contract knew that the 
lake and beach work depended upon Tangle Lake, Inc., doing certain 
work first. 
Is Tanglewood, Inc., liable to Sam Suburban? 
4. Sandy MacHeath, widower, died possessed of a certain 
farm and in his will provided, !'I devise my farm to my daughter 
Heather MacHeath, but if she should die without having any children 
of her own, then I want it to go to the children of my first-born 
son, Angus MacHeath, but to no others except the children of my son, 
Angus MacHea th, ii At the time of the mal{ing of the will, Heather 
was unmarried, and Angus was married and had one child, Laddie 
MacHeath. At the time of Sandy 1 s death, Angus had two children, 
Laddie and Paddy, but Heather was still unmarried. Five years sub-
sequent to Sandy 1 s death, Heather, who had been living on the farm, 
married Tom MacDougal, and they continued living on the farm 
seventeen more years but had no children, and Heather died on June 
26, 1964, survived only by her husband, Tom, whom she has named as 
her sole beneficiary in her will. During this seventeen-year period, 
Angus had two more children, named Harold and Lauder. Angus, Laddie, 
Paddy, Harold, and Lauder are all now living. 
Laddie and Paddy contend that they have the right to the· 
immediate and exclusive possession of the farm. 
Harold and Lauder contend that they have the right to 
immediate possession along with Laddie and Paddy. 
Tom MacDougal contests all their claims. 
What estate, interest, or right in the farm, if any, did 
Heather MacHeath have; and what estate, interest, or right in the 
farm, if any, do Laddie and Paddy MacHeath, Harold and Lauder 
MacHeath, and Tom MacDougal have? 
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5. Dowager, a childless widow, owned two large farms 
called the "Hill Farm 11 and the 11 valley Farm' 1 and also owned a large 
house in town, certain stocks and other intangiblesJ and tangible 
personal property of considerable value. In 1955, Dowager executed 
a valid will by which she provided in part: 
11 To Tom Jones, nephew of my late husband, I leave in fee 
simple all that tract of land lmown as the 'Valley Farm 1 and 
also my shares of stock, money, and all other intangible 
property after payment of charges against my estate. ;i 
11 To Sally Strange, my niece, I leave all the rest and 
residue of my property not otherwise disposed of, whether 
realty or personalty. 11 
In 1957, Dowager was adjudged mentally incompetent, and a 
committee was appointed to manage her affairs. In 1959, it became 
apparent that the two farms were to be taken by the Federal govern-
ment for a reclamation project, and the committee under court 
direction and in a proper suit sold the timber on the ~'Hill Farm 11 
for $5,000. The condemnation proceedings against the two farms were 
settled in 1960 with approval of the court by payment of $30,000 
for the "Valley Farm 11 and $15,000 for the "Hill Farm." Dowager 
died in 1961. Tom Jones conceded that Sally Strange was entitled 
to the town property and tangible personalty but claimed that he, 
Jones, was entitled to the money realized from the sale of the 
timber and from the condemnation of the 11 Hill Farm." A suit was 
instituted to decide the controversy. It was stipulated at trial 
that Dowager was competent at the time of making her will but 
incompetent from 1957 to the date of her death. 
Who is entitled to the $5,000 timber money and the $15,000 
condemnation settlement paid for the "Hill Farm 11 ? 
6. Raymond, a businessman in Suffolk, Virginia, had 
finished transacting some business with an acquaintance, Starbuck, 
when Starbuck mentioned that he was going to Portsmouth, Virginia, 
that day. Raymond asked if Starbuck would do him a favor and take 
a draft for $1,000 to the Portsmouth Loan Company and bring back 
the money. Starbuck said he would be glad to do it but intended 
to do some visiting, etc., and wouldn 1 t be coming bacl-<: from Ports-
mouth until late at night. Upon receiving this information, 
Raymond, not wishing to take a chance of loss of the money by being 
brought back late at night, then asked Starbuck to take the draft 
to Taylor, another businessman in Suffolk, and ask Taylor to send 
the draft by some responsible person. Starbuck took the draft to 
Taylor, but Taylor said that he was busy and asked Starbuck to take 
the draft to the bus depot and give it to Williams for Williams to 
take to Portsmouth. Starbuck went by the bus depot, but Williams 
told him he was not going to Portsmouth that day. 
Starbuck boarded a bus to Portsmouth and took the draft 
and when he arrived in Portsmouth got the money for the draft and 
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carefully put it in his inside coat pocket. He then visited several 
friends, had several drinks of whiskey but never became intoxicated, 
and checked on the money periodically. Starbuck started home in 
the early morning hours, sharing a taxi with four strangers. When 
he arrived at his room, he discovered that the money was gone, and 
he was never able to· find it. 
Raymond brought an action against Starbuck for the $1,000. 
Is Starbuck liable? 
7._ The Green Valley Grain Corporation was engaged, in 
Virginia, in the business of processing and selling grains at whole-
sale and retail. The Company received an order from the Long Horn 
Cattle Ranch, in Texas, for 300 barrels of Grade A Hybrid Yellow 
Corn, a well-known grade and species of corn. Green Valley Grain 
corporation advised Long Horn Cattle Ranch that it could not furnish 
the grade of corn it had ordered but that it did have in its posses-
sion a bin of Grade B Hybrid Yellow Corn, not exceeding 300 barrels, 
which it would sell at $'7.50 per barrel. In response to this advice 
the Long Horn Cattle Ranch addressed a letter to Green Valley Grain 
Corporation in which it stated: 
11 We desire to purchase, at the price quoted in your letter, the 
entire bin of Grade B Hybrid Yellow Corn. After you have 
determined the number of barrels of corn in the bin wire or 
call us and we shall send our trucks to pick up the corn.u 
In reply, Green Valley Grain Corporation sent the following telegram 
to Long Horn Cattle Ranch: 
"Holding bin of corn which you ordered by your last letter. 
Will measure at time ofi0;3.ding in your trucks. 11 
and, in reply, Long Horn cattle Ranch wired the Grain Corporation: 
"Received wire, will pick up corn at your plant Friday, March 
20, 1964, II 
Thereafter, but prior to March 20, 1964, the storage bins and 
contents of Green Valley, without fault on its part, were destroyed 
by fire. Green Valley Grain Corporation consults you and inquires 
whether it may recover from Long Horn Cattle Ranch the purchase 
price of the corn. 
How would you advise? 
8. Sam Parks sued Bill Dozer in the Circuit Court of 
Goochland County, Virginia, to recover damages for personal injuries 
resulting from an automobile collision. At the trial of the case 
the evidence established the following facts: The collision of the 
automobiles occurred at nighttime; Dozer was operating his car with 
his headlights on high beam; no other traffic was approaching from 
the direction in which Dozer was traveling; Dozer had been driving 
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for twelve hours without rest and was sleepy; Parks, who had been 
traveling in the same direction as Dozer, had stopped his car in 
Dozer's lane of traffic to talk to a friend of his who was standing 
by the roadside and while thus parked he turned on his parking 
lights, but due to faulty wiring the taillights on his car were not 
burning; Parks' car was black in color and the night was very dark 
and there was some fog; for a very brief moment before Parks' car 
came within the range of Dozer's headlights, Dozer nodded with sleep 
and when he awoke his car was approximately two car lengths behind 
Parks' car; Parks' car would have been observable within the range 
of Dozer's headlights when the Dozer car was six car lengths behind 
parks' car; startled by the sudden appearance of Parks' car in his 
lane of tr~ffic, Dozer forcibly applied the brakes of his car which 
was then traveling at the lawful speed of 55 miles per hour, but he 
was unable to bring his car to a stop before it struck the rear of 
Parks' car; Dozer, in the exercise of ordinary care, could have 
avoided striking the rear of Parks' car had he, immediately upon 
seeing it, cut his car to the left, but because of his alarm and 
the brief moment for action he elected to attempt to avoid the 
collision by applying his brakes. At the conclusion of the evidence 
the Court overruled Dozer's motion to strike the plaintiff's evidence, 
whereupon Dozer requested the Court to give an instruction on sudden 
emergency. 
Should the instruction be given? 
9. In the trial of an action for fraud and deceit, 
commenced by John Sawyer against Stephen Forester, the following 
facts were proved: Sawyer operated a saw mill and was engaged in 
the manufacture of lumber; Forester called upon Sawyer at the 
latter's home in Roanoke, and offered to sell to him a tract of pine 
timber, situate in Stafford County, Virginia; Sawyer told Forester 
that he was only interested in malcing purchases of timber tracts 
that would produce not less than 3,000,000 board feet of high quality 
pine lumber; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, "I have owned this 
tract of timber for 10 years, I have been over it many times, and 
it is my opinion that this tract of timber will cut 3,250,000 board 
feet of beautiful pine lumber, the highest quality"; Sawyer l{new 
that Forester had bought and sold timber tracts for more than 20 
years and that Forester had been employed for many years by different 
lumber companies to cruise timber tracts and to advise them upon 
the quality of timber; Sawyer told Forester that he was leaving the 
next day for a trip West and that he would not return for 2 months 
and because he would not have a chance to examine the timber he was 
interested in purchasing it; thereupon Forester said to Sawyer, 
111 am anxious to sell this tract of timber immediately and I know 
is what you want, and I repeat that it is my opinion that you 
cannot find better quality pine and I am also of the opinion that 
this tract will cut out at least 3,250,000 board feet"; Sawyer then 
said to Forester, 11 I know you have had a lot of experience and I 
cept your statement regarding the quality and quantity of the 
, and I am willing to buy your tract of timber and pay you 
sum of $19, 500 11 ; the written contract of sale and purchase, 
ter set out, was then signed by the parties; during Sawyer's 
- 7 -
absence his employees, at his direction 3 cut and removed the entire 
tract of timber and Sawyer learned upon his return the tract pro-
duced only 1,000,000 board feet of lumber; unbeY..nown to Sawyer, 
Forester had never cruised tlle tirr..ber tract but he believed that 
the tract actually did contain 3,250 3 000 board feet of timber; and 
plaintiff introduced in evidence the following written contract: 
"I, Stephen Forester, do hereby sell to John Sawyer the entire 
tract of pine timber, situate on my Pine Top Farm, Stafford 
County, Virginia, and John Sawyer does herewith agree to pay 
for said tract of timber upon the signing of ti1is contract the 
sum of $19,500. 







After all of the evidence had been introduced defendant 
moved to strike plaintiff's evidence and that summary judgment be 
for defendant. 
How should the Court rule? 
10. Jimmy Underpass, 17 years of age, invited Tommy 
Childress, 13 years of age, to ride with him on his single-seated 
motorcycle. Childress seated himself astride the gas tank, between 
the seat and the handlebars, and Underpass occupied the only seat on 
the motorcycle. While proceeding along a street in the City of 
Lynchburg, Virginia, the motorcycle collided at an intersection with 
another vehicle and Childress was seriously injured. A City 
Ordinance made it unlawful for the operator of a motorcycle to carry 
more persons than there are seats available, and it also made it 
unlawful for any person to ride or be transported upon such a vehicle 
unless occupying a regular seat. A violation of this ordinance 
would result in the imposition of a fine. Childress, by his next 
friend, sued Underpass to recover damages for personal injuries. 
During the trial of the case defendant requested and the Court gave 
an lnstruction telling the jury that Childress was guilty of 
negligence per se in violating the ordinance, and if such negligence 
constituted---a-contributing proximate cause of the collision plaintiff 
couJ.d not recover. The jury returned a verdict for the defendant 
and upon a motion to set aside the verdict plaintiff contended that 
the Court committed error in instructing the jury that plaintiff's 
Violation of the ordinance constituted negligence per se. 
How should the Court rule on the motion to set aside the 
* * * * * * * 
* * 
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